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Mathison: South Carolina Constitutional Law

SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I.

MUNICIPAL BOND FINANCING

In two similar decisions, Robinson v. White 1 and Kaminski v. Higgins,2 the Supreme Court of South Carolina held
that the use of business license taxes by municipalities to
secure bonds issued for the construction of projects unrelated
to those taxes, transgresses article VIII, section 7 of the South
Carolina Constitution as an attempt to create "bonded debt"
without an election as required by section 7.3 The court thus
halted the glacial extension of the special fund doctrine by4
establishing a moraine beyond the reach of municipalities.
In Robinson the defendants, the Mayor and City Council
of Greenville,5 proposed to issue $5,500,000 of revenue bonds6
1. 256 S.C. 410, 182 S.E.2d 744 (1971)
2. 257 S.C. 222, 185 S.E.2d 365 (1971).

(3-2 decision).

3. S.C. CoNsT. art. VIII, §7, reads in part as follows:
No city or town in this State shall hereafter incur any bonded
debt which, including existing bonded indebtedness, shall exceed
eight per centum of the assessed value of the taxable property
therein, and no such debt shall be created without submitting the
question as to the creation thereof to the qualified electors of
such city or town . . . and unless a majority of such electors
. . . shall be in favor of creating such further bonded debt, none
shall be created ....
4. The utility of the special fund doctrine lies primarily in circumventing
the strictures of article X, section 11 of the South Carolina Constitution, which
prohibit increasing the state debt without a favorable vote of two-thirds of
the state's electors. If a fund is specifically earmarked to secure the payment
of bonds issued, the election requirement is avoided notwithstanding the state's
full faith, credit and taxing power are also pledged. State ex reL Richards v.
Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269 (1929). The fund must be "reasonably
sufficient" to pay the bond debt. Mims v. McNair, 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E2d 355
(1969) (fund providing 150% of annual debt owed is reasonably sufficient).
The fund need not be created at the same time the bonds are issued and need
not be related to the purpose for which the bond revenue is used. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes, 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d 33 (1951) (state sales
tax pledged to secure school bonds). The latitude in financing encouraged by
this doctrine had never been explicitly allowed or denied municipalities. But cf.
Lillard v. Melton, 103 S.C. 10, 87 S.E. 421 (1915) (en banc decision).
5. Hereinafter designated "the City".
6. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§59-361 to -415 (1962), entitled "Revenue Bond
Act for Utilities." Revenue bonds, which theoretically pay for themselves, do
not constitute "bonded debt" within the ambit of the election requirement.
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for the purpose of building two public parking garages. Pursuant to the provisions of the Off-Street Parking Facilities
Act,7 the City intended to apply revenue generated by the
completed garages, as well as all other city parking revenue,
to service the bond obligations; the City also intended to
pledge as additional security moneys obtained from business
license taxes under the express authorization of section 59566.5 (1A) of the Act.8 The parties stipulated that revenue
derived from both on and off-street parking would be insufficient to discharge the indebtedness, and that an anticipated
$1,500,000 of -business license taxes would necessarily be
utilized over a ten year period to retire the bonds. The entire
plan was -to have been implemented without an election.
The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment enjoining
the allocation of business license taxes to such a project on
the grounds that section 59-566.5 (1A) of the Act was unconstitutional because it permitted the creation of "bonded debt"
without the referendum mandatory under article VIII, section 7. In response the City contended, and Justice Bussey in
his dissent agreed, that "bonded debt" signified "a primary
obligation of the particular political subdivision involved,
secured primarily by an ad valorem tax levied upon all the
taxable property therein." 9 In their view, since the City's financing proposal would influence property taxes only indirectly, if at all, it did not occasion "bonded debt" and was
therefore beyond the pale of the election requirement.
7. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§59-566 to -566.5 (1962), as amended, hereinafter referred to as "the Act".
8. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 788, §4 (1969) (codified at S.C. CoDE ANN.
§59-566.5(1A) (Cum. Supp. 1971)) reads in part:
Further powers of municipalities as to bonds.

(IA) Additionally secure the payment of the principal and interest
of bonds issued pursuant to this article by a pledge of so much
of the moneys as the municipality shall derive from business
license taxes as may be necessary to pay the principal of and
interest on any bonds issued under this article ....
9. 256 S.C. at 419, 182 S.E.2d at 748 (dissenting opinion). See Bolton v.

Wharton, 163 S.C. 242, 245, 161 S.E. 454, 459 (1931) (municipal bond defined); cf. Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S.C. 288, 135 S.E. 153 (1926).
The majority offered no specific definition of "bonded debt", which led Justice
Bussey to chide, "Our prior definition is too firmly and well established to be
currently discarded without even discussion." 256 S.C. at 420, 182 S.E2d at 749.
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The plaintiff maintained, however, that without an election the City could not issue bonds payable out of a special
fund, because the source of the fund, the business license
assessment, was unrelated to the purpose for which the bond
revenue was to be expended. 10 The gravamen of his argument
was that the debt created by the bond issue would not be selfliquidating, since to the extent business licefise taxes were
employed to service the debt, such taxes would have to be
diverted from the city's general fund. With the general fund
thus depleted, the defendants would have but two alternatives: either reduce the city budget and concomitantly curtail
services, or levy additional ad valorem taxes to replenish
the fund. 1 Therefore, the plaintiff argued that the financing
plan was merely fiscal legerdemain, the taxpayer inevitably
bearing the burden of the bond issue without having had an
opportunity to approve it.
The majority of the court accepted this thesis and noted
that the City was attempting "to do by indirection that which
it could not do by direction."' 2 The court delineated the purpose of the election provision embodied in article VIII, section
7 and found the abiding objective to be protection of the
taxpayer.
Having thus struck the pitch for the opinion, the court
explicitly distinguished Robinson from analogous decisions
elucidating article X, section 11 of the Constitution with reference to state financing and the application of the special
fund doctrine. 1 3 It dealt with Robinson as a case of first impression and chose to rely on a Colorado decision, City of

10. The plaintiff conceded that the direct relationship requirement was
obsolete with regard to state bond issues, but he asserted that it was an accepted principle, if not an express rule of law, governing municipal bond fi-

nancing. See generally Sullivan v. City Council of Charleston, 133 S.C. 189,
130 S.E. 876 (1925) ; Brownlee v. Brock, 107 S.C. 230, 92 S.E. 477 (1917);
and also Roach v. City of Columbia, 172 S.C. 478, 174 S.E. 461 (1934) (revenue
bonds); Cathcart v. City of Columbia, 170 S.C. 362, 170 S.E. 435 (1933)
(same).
11. The defendants maintained that any increase in ad valorem taxes was
remote, conjectural, and in no sense a primary obligation of the City.
12. 256 S.C. at 417, 182 S.E.2d at 747.
13. Cases cited note 4 supra.
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Trinidadv. Haxby,'4 in which the court invalidated a financing plan nearly identical to that in Robinson.
Thus, after deciding that fiscal retrenchment by the City
of Greenville in response to the proposed diversion of business
license taxes was rather unlikely, the court stated that regardless of whether the City reduced its services or alternatively sought supplementary revenue, either from new sources
or, as the plaintiff contended, from an increase in ad valorem
taxes, ,the onus of the bond issue would ultimately fall "upon
such a large segment of the people as to effectually be the
obligation of taxpayers generally." 15 The court concluded that
the City's financing proposal therefore engendered "bonded
debt" within the purview of article VIII, section 7, and accordingly declared section 59-566.5(lA) of the Off-Street
Parking Facilities Act unconstitutional for purporting to
allow the issuance of bonds without the requisite election.
Four months later in Kaminski v. Higgins the court in
a per curiam opinion clearly circumscribed the special fund
doctrine in the area of municipal financing. By special enactment the General Assembly empowered the City of Georgetown to issue $300,000 of general obligation bonds for the
purpose of constructing a combination police station and fire
house. 16 The bonds were to be secured by a pledge of the business license taxes collected in the city and also by the city's
full faith, credit and taxing power. The Act further authorized
the issuance of bonds without electoral approval, provided no
property taxes were pledged to pay for the bonds.' 7 As is
readily apparent, the legislature tried to cast this plan precisely in the mold of those approved under the special fund
doctrine.' 8
14. 136 Colo. 168, 315 P.2d 204 (1957). The dissenters, Bussey and Brailsford, Jj., found this case to be fragile authority because of "fundamental differences between the pertinent laws of that state and those of this state." 256
S.C. at 420, 182 S.E.2d at 749.
15. 256 S.C. at 418, 182 S.E2d at 748.
16. 56 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 3036 (1970), hereinafter referred to as "the
Act".
17. Id. §1. Also included in the Act was a provision specifying that the
business license tax fund should not be less than 150% of the amount needed
to service the annual bond debt. Id. §10.
18. To this end the Act optimistically provided: "Such funds are therefore
permitted under the special fund doctrine . . . " Id. §1.
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The plaintiff alleged that the Act was in violation of
article VIII, section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution. In
all essentials his argument echoed that of the plaintiff in
Robinson. Kaminski emphasized that under the financing plan
the pledged business license taxes would not be available to
meet the city's general operating expenses, and that therefore
the plan would eventually saddle the taxpayer with the cost of
the bond issue without regard for the election requirement.
The trial court had ruled against the plaintiff on the
authority of Briggs v. Greenville County 19 and Mims v.
McNair.20 In Mims an act authorizing the issuance of state
capital improvement bonds secured by a designated fund, the
state income tax, as well as the state's full faith, credit and
taxing power, was held under the special fund doctrine to
be exempt from the election provision in article X, section 11
21
of the Constitution.
The supreme court, however, expressly rejected the obvious parallel between state and municipal financing programs and tersely established Robinson as the paradigm
among decisions in the latter field. The court held the special
fund doctrine "to be inapplicable to municipal bonds to be
paid in substantial part from the pledge of revenues derived
from business licenses, which, as here, were unrelated to 'the
public improvement for which the bonds were authorized. ' 22
II.
A.

ALCOHoLic BEVERAGES

Taxation

The fundamental issue disputed in Heublein,Inc. v. South
CarolinaTax Commission 23 was whether the power to regulate the transportation and sale of intoxicating beverages,
19. 137 S.C. 288, 135 S.E. 153 (1926). In this decision the court upheld
the validity of road construction bonds issued by the county without an election
under the authority of enabling legislation. The bonds were payable out of
reimbursements made by the state to the county from gasoline and vehicle

license taxes.
20. 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E.2d 355 (1969).

21. See cases cited note 4 supra.
22. 257 S.C. at 225, 185 S.E.2d at 366.

23. 257 S.C. 17, 183 S.E.2d 710 (1971), afj'd, 41 U.S.L.W. 4093 (U.S.
Dec. 18, 1972) (No. 71-879)
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24
reserved to the states by the twenty-first amendment,
transcends the power to define due process standards for state
taxation of interstate commerce, conceded to Congress under
the commerce clause. 25 The South Carolina Supreme Court
held, albeit obliquely, that the states' regulatory power is
26
paramount.

Heublein, a foreign corporation, challenged the state's
right to levy a tax on its income resulting from sales of liquor
in South Carolina. The plaintiff maintained that the imposition of the tax contravened Public Law 86-272,27 enacted by
Congress in 1959.28 This statute prohibits a state tax assessment on a non-resident's net income derived within the state
from interstate sales of tangible personalty, when the extent
of the non-resident's business activities within the state is
defined by, or does not exceed, certain "minimum contacts"
synopsized as follows: the soliciting of orders, the sending
of orders outside the state for acceptance or rejection, and
the filling of orders by shipment from without the state.20

Heublein averred that its business activities in South
Carolina were within the ambit of Public Law 86-272, and
that consequently it was exempt from the state income tax.

Moreover, the plaintiff contended that if its activities did not
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §2, reads: "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery
or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited."
25. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8.
26. Since the repeal of prohibition the states have been allowed virtually
unbridled authority in restricting the sale and distribution of alcohol, often by
methods that would have amounted to unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce bad other commodities been involved. See, e.g., United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945) (especially concurring opinion
of Frankfurter, J.).
27. Interstate Income Act §§101 et seq., 15 U.S.C. §§381-4 (1970), hereinafter designated "Public Law 86-272" as in Heublein.
28. Public Law 86-272 was passed as a congressional rejoinder to the
Supreme Court's holding that states could levy an income tax on corporations
engaged in interstate commerce, provided the tax was not discriminatory and
was apportioned to local activities within the state. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). It was held to be constitutional in 1964. International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 344, 164 So.2d
314 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902 (1964) (19 states as amici curiae in
support of petition).
29. 15 U.S.C. §381(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
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,conform to those described in the statute, such activities were
involuntary, compelled by the plaintiff's compliance with
30
article seven of the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Act,
which prescribes in purposeful detail the permissible method
of importing and selling intoxicants in South Carolina. Pertinent provisions of article seven require distillers to appoint
a resident of the state as a "producer representative" and to
register him with the Tax Commission.3 1 All shipments of
liquor must be made directly to this representative and must
be received by him within the geographic limits of the state;
only then can any sale of liquor be completed by its distribution to purchasing wholesalers. 32 In effect, a producer is constrained to deliver liquor to itself in South Carolina prior to
selling it within the state. Thus all sales are localized and
thereby stripped of possible tax immunity under Public Law
86-272.
The plaintiff did not contest the state's power under the
aegis of the twenty-first amendment to apply such regulations
to the transportation of alcohol. Instead, it vigorously insisted
that the twenty-first amendment does not authorize the state
to levy an income tax pursuant to, and as the proximate consequence of, its regulatory power, when the tax is in derogation
of a federal statute reinforced by the commerce clause, namely,
Public Law 86-272. 33 Implicit in the plaintiff's contention
was a denial of the state's power to alter the intrinsic character of interstate commerce for the purpose of imposing a tax.
The supreme court deflated this argument inferentially
by establishing the primacy of the state's regulatory power.
Without elaboration the court held that the statutory procedure governing the importation and sale of liquor "constitutes
a valid exercise of the State's powers under the Twenty-first
30. S.C. CODE ANN. §§4-131 to -150 (1962).
31. Id. §§4-131(3), -138.
32. Id. §4-141.
33. Plaintiff depended heavily on Oklahoma Tax Conme' v. Brown-

Forman Distillers Corp., 420 P.2d 894 (Okla. 1966), in which the court held
that the state's attempt to justify an income tax as an alcohol regulation was
ineffective for contradicting Public Law 86-272. In this case the relation of
the tax to a scheme of regulation was tenuous at best.
See also Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324
(1964), to the effect that the twenty-first amendment did not pro tanto repeal
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce involving alcohol.
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Amendment."3 4 Thus, the issue was perfunctorily resolved

for, as the court noted, the requirements of article seven "preclude the sale of alcoholic liquors in South Carolina through
interstate sales,"3 5 and therefore prevent the application of

Public Law 86-272.
On appeal the United States Supreme Court approved

and embellished this rationale holding that "South Carolina
may, pursuant to an otherwise valid regulatory scheme, com-

pel Heublein to undertake activities which take it beyond the
protection of [Public Law 86-272]."3 6 Avoiding conflict, the
Court first determined that Congress did not intend Public
Law 86-272 to inhibit valid state regulation of alcohol. The
Court next found that the state statute localizing sales of
liquor was reasonably related to legitimate state purposes,OaS
and was not designed merely to require a sufficient nexus for
taxation. 36" Thus, because the regulation was upheld, the tax
incident to the regulation was similarly sustained.
B.

Retail Licensing

In Terry v. Pratt37 the court held that the statute38 empowering the Alcoholic

Beverage Control Commission to

refuse to grant a retail liquor license because of the "unsuit34. 257 S.C. at 20, 183 S.E.2d at 712, citing State v. Kilgore 233 S.C. 6, 103
S.E2d 321 (1958). In Kilgore the court said, "[E]ach state has power, unfettered by the commerce clause, to regulate or prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquor for delivery or use within its borders." Id. at 8, 103 S.E2d at 322.
Accord, Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939) ; State Bd. of Equalization
v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
35. 257 S.C. at 20, 183 S.E.2d at 712.
36. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4093.
36a. Localization of sales expedites record keeping and the maintenance of
wholesale prices at the national minimum. Id. at 4095.
36b. Such disingenuous use of liquor regulations would fail for frustrating
the objective of Public Law 86-272. Id.
37. 187 S.E.2d 884 (S.C. 1972).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. §4-53 (1962) provides in part:
The Commission shall refuse to grant any license mentioned in
this chapter if it shall be of the opinion that:
(2) The store or place of business to be occupied by the
applicant is not a suitable place ....
It should also be noted that the Commission has exclusive authority to grant
or deny retail liquor licenses, id. §4-31(3), subject to review by the courts only
on certiorari; id. §4-58.
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ability" of the nature or location of a proposed store is not
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
The plaintiff had applied for a license to operate a liquor
store in an unincorporated section of Anderson County; the
Commission decided that the prospective store lacked adequate police protection 39 and was otherwise unsuitable.40 In
attacking this ruling, the plaintiff broached two kindred
objections: that the ruling was arbitrary and capricious because unsupported by the evidence, 41 and that section 4-53 (2)
of the South Carolina Code was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power, because the statutory procedure for
granting licenses left to the Commission's absolute discretion
42
the determination of the "suitability" of liquor store sites.
Deciding the amorphous constitutional question 3 entailed
pouring old wine into a new bottle, as the court relied extensively on past decisions. 44 The court also embraced the traditional test of constitutionality:
[I]t is necessary that the statute declare a legislative policy, establish
primary standards for carrying it out, or lay down an intelligible
principle to which an administrative officer or body must conform,
with a proper regard for the protection of the public interests .... 45

In applying this test to Terry, the court found that while
the General Assembly vested in the Commission the authority
to grant or refuse liquor licenses, it simultaneously narrowed
39. S.C. CODE ANN. §4-37 (1962) provides for retail liquor licensing in
unincorporated communities and reads in part, "But the Commission shall not
license a retail dealer in any locality unless the Commission is assured that
such locality is under proper police protection."
40. Id. §4-53(2).
41. The court resolved this question against the plaintiff on the strength
of testimony by the sheriff to the effect that plaintiff's store lacked police
protection. See Record at 12.
42. S.C. CONST. art. III, §1, vests legislative power in the two branches
of the General Assembly and tacitly forbids delegation of that power.
43. "It is undoubtedly true that legislative power cannot be delegated; but
it is not always easy to say what is and what is not legislative power . ..."
187 S.E.2d at 887, quoting from Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood 340 S.C.
519, 524, 9 S.E. 686, 688 (1889). The problem has often been compounded by
semantic subtlety and gossamer distinctions.
44. See, e.g., State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 469, 150 S.E.
269, 273 (1929); Cole v. Manning, 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E2d 621 (1962).
45. 187 S.E.2d at 887-8, quoting from Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. South
Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 245 S.C. 229, 234, 139 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1965).
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the focus of that authority by requiring the Commission to
deny a license unless it was assured that the site of a proposed
store was under proper police protection and, pursuant to
section 4-53 (2), that the place of business to be occupied by
the applicant was a suitable one. The court concluded that
read in rarimateriathe legislative grant of authority and the
limitations attendant to it "declared a legislative policy and
established primary standards to govern the Commission in
refusing an application for a license."4 6 Therefore, the court
held, "It follows that the delegation of the foregoing authority
under Section 4-53 (2), of the Code, was not an unconstitu'4
tional delegation of legislative power. ' 7
III.

EDUCATION

48

In Hunt v. McNair the South Carolina Supreme Court
reaffirmed the constitutionality of the Educational Facilities
Authority Act, 49 a statute enabling the State Budget and Control Board, serving as the Educational Facilities Authority, 0
to issue revenue bonds to provide financing for institutions
of higher learning. In accordance with the Act, the Baptist
College of Charleston sought the issuance of $3,500,000 of
bonds in order to discharge indebtedness accrued from the
acquisition of equipment, improvements made to its physical
plant, and also from its outstanding mortgage serial bonds.
At no cost to the state the college proposed to convey virtually
its entire campus to the Authority, 51 which in turn would issue
state revenue bonds, then lease the facilities back to the college at a rental sufficient to retire the bonds, and upon retirement reconvey the property to the college. The advantage
inuring to the college from this plan was the low rate of
interest, and thus lower payments, resulting from the tax-free
status of state bonds.
The plaintiff, as a citizen and taxpayer, originally assailed the Act on a panoply of constitutional grounds in a case
46. 187 S.E.2d at 888.
47. Id. Honestly.
48. 187 S.E.2d 645 (S.C. 1972), prob. 1ur. noted, 93 S. Ct. 223 (No. 711523).
49. S.C. CODE AxN. §§22-41 to -41.17 (Cum. Supp. 1971), hereinafter
referred to as "the Act".
50. Id. §22-41.3, hereinafter referred to as "the Authority".
51. The court pointedly noted that two of the buildings not included in the
property to be conveyed to the state were financed in part by federal loans.
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considered by the court in 1970 ;52 at that time the Act survived unscathed. 3 The United States Supreme Court, however,
vacated and remanded the case for reexamination 54 guided by
four novel Court decisions: Lemon v. Kurtzman,5 5 Robinson v.
DiCenso,56 Earley v. DiCenso,57 all consolidated in the same
opinion, and Tilton v. Richardson.58 These decisions were
predicated upon the religion guarantees of the first amendment; thus, the question on remand as construed by the court
was whether the Educational Facilities Authority Act offends
the establishment clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. 59 The court held that it does not.
As a prologue to this decision the court detailed the several provisions embodied in the Act and the substantive rules
adopted by the Authority designed to prevent the confluence
of state and church interests. The court scrutinized the legislative objective of the Act, and found that the Act was intended solely to enhance the general welfare by offering "a
measure of assistance . . . to enable institutions for higher
education in the State to provide the facilities and structures
which are sorely needed . . . ."60 The court concluded that
such is a legitimate secular purpose, neither advancing nor

52. Hunt v. McNair, 255 S.C. 71, 177 S.E2d 362 (1970), noted in 23
S.C.L. REv. 644, 645 (1971) (Survey of S. C. Law).
53. Amidst the plaintiff's other contentions, the assertion that the Act
violated the establishment clause was not accorded much weight by the court,
which concluded, "Having held that neither the credit of the State nor the
property of the State is involved, it follows that this constitutional provision
is not violated." 255 S.C. at 86, 177 S.E.2d at 370.
54. Hunt v. McNair, 403 U.S. 945 (1971) (mem.).
55. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Burger, C.J.), noted in 17 VILL. L. REv. 574
(1972) ; 40 FORD. L. REV. 371 (1971).
56. Sub nor. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), aff'g $ub nor.
DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
57. Id. Earley, whose children attended parochial schools, was, among
others, an intervenor-defendant in the action brought by DiCenso in the district
court. The Supreme Court styled his appeal as a separate case in its collective
opinion.
58. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
59. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I; S.C. CoNsT. art. I, §4. As the court noted,
the language of these provisions is nearly identical and prohibits laws "respecting an establishment of religion."

60. S.C. CODE ANN. §22-41 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
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inhibiting religion, and therefore in conformity with first
61
amendment requirements.
In turning its attention to the primary effect of the Act,
the court noted by way of introduction: "The establishment
clauses are intended to afford protection against sponsorship,
financial support and active involvement of the government
in religious activity." 62 To gauge the permissible level of government involvement, the court employed three of the Supreme
Court decisions as benchmarks and analyzed them as follows.
In Earley and in Robinson, a Rhode Island statute authorizing salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in
non-public schools was held unconstitutional.6 3 In Lemon a
similar though more comprehensive Pennsylvania statute met
the same fate.6 4 Each statute contained an imposing body of
regulations, and to ensure compliance, provided for state
examination of the recipient teachers' methods, texts and
other materials, as well as for periodic state auditing of the
participating schools' financial records. The Supreme Court
concluded that because of the pervasive and continuous surveillance necessary to enforce such regulations, the statutes
in all three cases fostered excessive entanglement between
government and religion. 65
61. In School Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963),

Mr. Justice Clark said:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and
the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the
scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
•. . [T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause
there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Id. at 222.
See also Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) ; Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
62. 187 S.E.2d at 648; see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
(upholding tax exemptions for places of worship), noted in 49 N.C.L. REV.
342 (1971).
63. Salary Supplement Act of 1969, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§16-51-1 to -9
(Supp. 1971).

64. Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1968, 24 PA.
STAT. ANN. §§5601-5609 (Supp. 1971).

65. The "excessive entanglement" test was adopted by the Supreme Court
as a corollary to the "purpose and primary effect" test in Walz v. Tax Conm'n,
397 U.S. 664 (1970), in an attempt to derive a viable and consistent standard.
As Chief Justice Burger said, however, each establishment clause decision is
in large part a value judgement. Id. at 669.
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On the basis of this analysis, the court decided that Hunt
was distinguishable from these cases and said:
The surveillance on the part of the State, obviously abhorred by the
[Supreme] Court, is not necessary under the proposed financing plan
of the college. . The State plays a passive and very limited role
in the implementation of the Act, serving principally as a mere conduit through which institutions may borrow funds for the purposes
06
of the Act on a tax-free basis.

The court emphasized that pursuant to the Act the Authority
intended to mortgage the college property to a trustee bank

and, after leasing the property back to the college, to assign all
rights under the lease to the trustee. 67 Thus, the trustee would

assume responsibility for disbursing the bonds with the rental
fees received from the college, "so that upon delivery of the

bonds the interest of the Authority would, for all practical
purposes, cease." 68
In response to the plaintiff's contention that the broad,

contingent language of the Act would inexorably mire the
state in the administration of the college, the court concluded:
A reading of the Act . . . indicates that the basic function of the

Authority is to see that religion is not promoted on the leased premises,
and that fees are charged sufficient to meet the bond payments. The
decisions recognize that some involvement between church and State
is not constitutionally obnoxious. It is a question of degree and each
case must be judicially determined on its own facts ....69

The final issue before the court was whether the Tiltou
decision necessarily undermined the Act. In Tilton Connecticut
taxpayers impugned the constitutionality of a statute autho-

rizing federal grants to colleges for the construction of academic facilities. 70 Under one section of the statute the
government retained a twenty-year interest in each project
funded, and was entitled to a pro rata return of its grant if

during that period the project was used for sectarian instruction or worship.7 1 The United States Supreme Court abro66. 187 S.E.2d at 650-1.
67. See S.C. Coon ANN. §22-41.9 (Cum Supp. 1971).
68. 187 S.E.2d at 651.
69. Id.
70. Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C. §§711 et seq.
(1970).
71. Higher Education Facilities Act, Pub. L. No. 88-204, §404, 77 Stat.
363 (1963) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §754 (1970)).
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gated this section because it found that federally funded structures would still have considerable value after twenty years
and that the government, by eventually allowing unrestricted
use of such structures, would thus be making contributions to
72
religious institutions.
As the court pointed out, however, the balance of the
statute authorizing aid to chuch-supported colleges remained
intact, since the Supreme Court excised only the inadequate
twenty-year prohibition of religious use. Therefore, the court
drew a distinction by noting first, that under the Educational
Facilities Authority Act, a project used for sectarian purposes
would be summarily excluded from the financing program;73
and second, that pursuant to the rules adopted by the Authority, the eventual reconveyance of property to Baptist
College would be effected by deed subject to the condition that
no facility financed by the proceeds of state bonds was ever
to be used for sectarian purposes, either by the college, or by
any voluntary grantee of the college. 74 Because of these prophylactic provisions the court concluded that the implementation of the Act would not entail a state contribution to religion,
and thus held that the decisive objection in Tilton was not
applicable to Hunt.
IV.

JUDICIAL APPORTIONMENT

O'Shields v. McLeod 5 was an action challenging the constitutionality of the South Carolina circuit court system. The
crux of O'Shields' complaint was that because of gross population disparities among the state's sixteen judicial circuits,
the quality of the administration of justice in overpopulated
circuits was inferior to that in less populous circuits.7 6 The
72. The Court held this section to be severable, and the remainder of the
Act still obtains. See 403 U.S. at 683.
73. S.C. CODE ANN. §22-41.2(b) (Cum. Supp. 1971) renders ineligible for
financing "any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a
place of religious worship . . . or to be used primarily in connection with ...
a school or department of divinity for any religious denomination."
74. See 187 S.E.2d at 647-8 (rule no. 4).

75. 257 S.C. 477, 186 S.E2d 408 (1972).
76. For an indication of the extent of the population imbalance, see Record
at 31-3 and App. "F". Four circuits in the last 50 years have far exceeded the
state's average rate of growth, the result being that population in the Seventh,
Fifth, Ninth and Thirteenth Circuits varies from 31% to 87% respectively
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plaintiff attacked the court system on multiple grounds, which
were sustained by the trial court with one exception.71 The
supreme court, however, reversed emphatically.
O'Shields first argued that the population variance
among the judicial circuits had historically been much less
pronounced, and that the framers of the South Carolina Constitution envisioned equal population distribution being the
template for maintaining and realigning the circuits. He
therefore contended that article V, section 13 of the Constitution tacitly required all circuits to have substantially equal
numbers of people.71 Finding no support for this contention
in the language of article V, the court routinely dismissed it.
The plaintiff next averred that citizens in overpopulated
circuits were denied equal access to, and treatment within,
the judicial process, and that such inequities amounted to
invidious discrimination as contemplated by the equal protection clauses of both the federa 1 9 and state 0 Constitutions.
To this the Attorney General responded that the "one man,
one vote" principle was limited exclusively to situations in
which government officials were popularly elected under conditions of malapportionment,8 1 and he catalogued the decisions
holding that there is no constitutional requirement that judges
be allocated on the basis of population.8 2 The supreme court,
however, disposed of the question on different grounds, conabove the median population figure of 157,000 per circuit. At the same time
eight of the eleven circuits under the median are from 20% to 40% underpopulated. Id. at 32.
77. The plaintiff alleged that the collection of taxes to support the statewide circuit court system was unconstitutional because citizens in overpopulated
circuits were not receiving fair value in return for their tax dollars. Neither
the lower court nor the supreme court considered this question.
78. S.C. CoNsT. art. V, §13, reads in part:
The State shall be divided into as many Judicial Circuits as the
General Assembly may prescribe, and for each Circuit a Judge
shall be elected by joint viva voce vote of the General Assembly,
who shall hold his office for a term of four years ....
79. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1.
80. S.C. CoNsT. art. I, §5.
81. Circuit judges, of course, are elected by the General Assembly. The
plaintiff argued that this was a vicarious form of popular election and noted,
perhaps portentously, that circuit solicitors are elected by the people.
82. Sce, e.g., Kail v. Rockefeller, 275 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y. 1967);
New York State Ass'n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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eluding: "The respondent neither alleged nor offered to prove
discriminatory rendition of judicial services; hence, the [trial]
court's finding of a violation . . . in this respect is without
83
support in the record.
On the strength of the plaintiff's contentions, the trial
court had also invalidated the statute authorizing the chief
justice to provide for periodic interchange of circuit judges as
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. 84 In reversing, the supreme court peremptorily disposed
of the issue, deciding that since the plaintiff neither alleged
nor proved that the rotation of circuit judges had prejudiced
him, he "palpably lacked standing to question the statute's
validity." 85
The final question presented to the court was whether
the General Assembly could create multi-judge circuits without offending the constitutional provisions governing the circuit court system embodied in article V, section 13.86 The
plaintiff sought this interpretation to clear the path for corrective relief, since he maintained that multi-judge circuits
offered the best remedy for defects alleged to inhere in the
circuit system. In its reapportionment order the trial court
ruled that the creation of multi-judge circuits was constitutionally practicable. That conclusion, however, was enervated
by the supreme court's holding that "[t] he courts of this
87
State . . . are without authority to issue advisory opinions."
Although O'Shields was decided on peripheral considerations, the court clearly indicated that the malapportioned
circuit court system is immune to attack, at least on equal
protection grounds, by stating:
83. 257 S.C. at 481, 186 S.E2d at 409.
84. S.C. CODE ANN. §15-129 (1962) in essence authorizes the chief justice
to form a roster of circuit judges and to "arrange a regular and continuous
assignment and interchange of circuits among such judges . . . ." The plaintiff
contended that this section was an unconstitutional transfer of legislative
power in violation of S.C. CONsT. art. V, §14, which reads: "Judges of the
Circuit Courts shall interchange Circuits with each other, and the General
Assembly shall provide therefor." (Emphasis added).
85. 257 S.C. at 481, 186 S.E.2d at 409.
86. S.C. CoNsT. art. V, §13, provides in part, "[F]or each Circuit a Judge
shall be elected... " The question turned upon whether the term "a Judge"
connoted only one judge or, as the trial court held, at least one judge.
87. 257 S.C. at 481, 186 S.E2d at 409.
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[T]he authority, and with it the duty and responsibility, to divide the
State into appropriate judicial circuits is vested in the General Assembly by Article V, Section 13 of our Constitution. Thus, by organic
law, the power to correct the present, lamentable imbalance in judicial
circuits rests exclusively in that body, which is responsible directly
to the people. 88

ROBERT V. MATHISON, JR.

88. Id. In response to this mild exhortation as well as popular sentiment
the General Assembly at this writing is considering a constitutional amendment that would eliminate many of the problems in the circuit court system.
See Journal of the Senate, N. 101, S. 428, p. 22 (July 5, 1972).
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